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AGENCy-AGREEMENT WITH BROKER GIVING "EXCLUSIVE SALE.'--The defendant
signed a written agreement giving the plaintiff, a real estate broker, the "exclu-
sive sale" of certain land for a specified period, promising to pay an agreed com-
mission. The broker paid nothing for the promise nor did he in words agree to
undertake the sale. But he did spend time and money trying to sell the property.
Before he succeeded the defendant made the sale himself. Plaintiff sued for
his commission. Held, that the plaintiff could not recover, since the promise was
gratuitous. Roberts v. Harrington (1918, Wis.) 169 N. W. 6o3.
See COMMENTS, p. 575, supra.
BANKRUPTCY-INSURANCE POLICIES-RIGHTS OF TRUSTEE UNDER EXEMfPTION
STATUTEs.-The bankrupt took out two policies of life insurance, one payable
to his executors or assigns and the other to his brother and sister, with full
power in the insured to change the beneficiaries. At the time of the bankruptcy
his wife was the beneficiary of both policies, provided "she outlives" the insured,
with power reserved in him to change the beneficiary or surrender the policies at
any time, thus realizing their cash value. When the policies were demanded by
his trustee in bankruptcy he contended that the beneficiary's interests could not
be defeated, because of a Georgia statute which provides: "The assured may
direct the money to be paid to his personal representatives or to his widow or to
his children or to his assignee; and upon such direction given and assented to
by the insurer no other person can defeat the same. But the assignment is good
without such assent." Held, that the policies passed to the trustee. Cohn v.
Malone (I919) 39 Sup. Ct. 141.
Where there is no local exemption statute, all the life and endowment policies
of the bankrupt which have an actual cash value pass to the trustee. Equitable
Assurance Soc. -. Miller (ig91, C. C. A. 8th) 185 Fed. 98 (endowment) ; Cohen
v. Samuels (917) 245 U. S. 50, 38 Sup. Ct. 36 (life); see (1918) 27 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 4o3. And this is true although the insured has not reserved the power
to change the beneficiary. In re Boardman (igoo, D. Mass.) IO3 Fed. 783
(endowment); In re Coleman (i9o5, C. C. A. 2d) 136 Fed. 88 (life). In a
majority of jurisdictions statutes are in force which exempt from the claims, of
creditors insurance policies payable to the insured's wife or immediate rela-
tives. Such policies do not pass to the trustee in bankruptcy, because of the
exemption of sec. 6 of the Bankruptcy Act. And this section is not limited by
sec. 7oa. Holden v. Stratton (i9o5) 198 U. S. 2o2, 25 Sup. Ct. 656. Even
when the insured has power to change the beneficiary, it is generally held that the
policy is covered by such exemption. In re Orear (1911, C. C. A. 8th) i89 Fed.
888; contra, In re Loveland (i912, D. Mass.) i92 Fed. ioo5, reversed on another
point (i912, C. C. A. ist) 2oo Fed. 136. The minority view, as illustrated by the
case last cited, reasons that the power to change the beneficiary gives the insured
such dominion over the policy as to make it an asset of his estate. The principal
case places a construction upon the Georgia statute which in effect adopts this
view. If, as would seem to be true, the insured's "dominion over the policy"
lies in his power to defeat the beneficiary's interest, the same result would
logically be reached where the insured has power to so defeat it by surrendering
the policy for cash. So it has been held. In re White (igog, C. C. A. 2d) 174
Fed. 333. It is made even clearer that this interest should pass as an asset, by
the fact that the insured can assign it at will. See (1918) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL,
1o83. It is submitted, therefore, that if the minority doctrine be applied to such
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statutes, they logically become of no effect whatever as regards the Bankruptcy
Act. For no policy having any cash value, whether realizable through assign-
ment, through change of beneficiary, or through surrender, even where there 
is
no power to change the beneficiary, would be exempt. Such a result, 
it is
submitted, defeats the purpose of the statute. It might, however, be 
avoided
by making a distinction: exempting a policy which must be surrendered 
and can-
celled to defeat the beneficiary, and not exempting one where he may 
be defeated
and the policy still kept alive.
CONFLCT OF LAws-F LL FAIrH AND CREDIT-CONcLUSIvEN sS OF 
REcrrAL OF
SERvICE IN STATE JuDGmENT.-An action was brought in Michigan 
on a Pennsyl-
vania judgment. One of the defenses was that the defendant had neither 
been
served with process in the Pennsylvania action nor been given any 
notice of the
same. Held, that these facts, if true, constituted a defense. Smithan, 
v. Gray
(198, Mich.) 168 N. W. 998.
See COMMENTS, p. 579, supra.
CoNsTrruTIONAL LAw-RATE FIXING STATUTE-SUPERVENING UNcoNsTIUTION-
ALrrY-SPERaVNING BECAUSE OF CHANGING CoNDITIoNs -The 
plaintiff, a cor-
poration furnishing gas to the city of Albany, brought action for an 
injunction
against the further enforcement of a rate-fixing statute passed in 
19o7. The
corporation alleged that with the rise in the cost of gas-producing the 
rates had
become confiscatory. The defendants maintained that the statute 
in question,
having admittedly been constitutional when passed, could not later 
be attacked.
Held, that the complaint stated a cause of action. (igig, N. Y.) 121 N. E. 772.
See COMMENTS, p. 592, supra.
CORPORATIONS-REINSTATEMENT AFTR FORITURE-LIABLrrY 
OF DnIcroRs.-
A New Jersey statute provided that a corporation failing to pay a tax 
assessed
against it for two successive years should on proclamation.by the governor 
for-
feit all powers conferred upon it by law, which powers should be deemed 
there-
after "inoperative and void." The defendant was a director in the 
Crosthwaite
and Cannon Company, which neglected to pay such tax; wherefore 
the governor
proclaimed their charter void. The company continued to carry on its 
business
and entered into a contract with the plaintiff who, alleging breach on the 
part of
the corporation, brought suit for damages, but against the directors individually.
The defendants set up that the governor, after his proclamation of cancellation,
has issued an order reinstating the corporation in all its franchises nunc pro tunc.
Held, that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover; one ground being that 
one
who contracts with a .- rporation whose franchise has been terminated 
by the
state for failure to pay a tax must be deemed to have contracted "under 
the
implied agreement" that the corporation might be reinstated, and any individual
liability of the directors thereby barred. Held v. Crosthwaite (9ig8, S. D. N. 
Y.)
6o N. Y. L. J. 66I (Nov. 27, 1gI8).
There seems no reason to question the soundness of the decision. It 
is at least
doubtful whether the directors were ever liable. Forfeiture of a corporation's
charter' for misuser or non-user of corporate franchises can ordinarily 
take
effect only on judgment in a proper judicial proceeding brought 
by the state.
7 R- C. L. 731; Clark & Marshall, Corps. sec. 213. And 
the state may waive the
forfeiture. Clark, Corps. (3d ed., i916) 3o6. The charter itself may indeed
reserve to the legislature power to revoke. Greenwood v. Union 
Freight Ry.
(i881) 105 U. S. 13. But it does not follow that such reservation 
is self-exec-
utory. New York, etc. Co. v. Smith (i896) 148 N. Y. 540, 42 N. E. io88; 
and
see 2 Morawetz, Corps. sec. ioo6; 8 Am. St. Rep. 8o3, note. Even less 
will a
general statute be necessarily self-executory, when it provides that 
non-compliance
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with given conditions will ipso facto work forfeiture. Cluthe v. Evansville,
etc. R. R. (x91) 176 Ind. 162, 95 N. E. 543; Ann. Cas. r914A 935, note. That
question seems to depend on the legislature's intent. Kaiser, etc. Co. v. Cary
(i9o9) 155 Cal. 638, io3 Pac. 341; Clark, Corps. (3d ed., i9x6) 301. It has been
held that executive proclamation could not take the place of a judicial decree.
Shand v. Gage (1877) 9 S. C. 187. There seems, therefore, good ground to
believe that unless the statute was itself of the kind deemed self-executory a
governor's proclamation, as in the instant case, could not put the corporation
entirely out of business. Even if it could, the question would arise whether the
making of the proclamation without a hearing would not violate due process.
Cf. (igig) 28 YALE LAW JOUR T., 391. But assuming a valid non-judicial for-
feiture, it does not follow that the directors incurred personal liability in carry-
ing on the corporate business. After such forfeiture the body often has at
least some of the marks of a de facto corporation. In the majority of jurisdic-
tions it can still contract, and can sue and be sued as a corporation on contracts
made both before and after forfeiture. Gilmer Creamery Assn. v. Qtientin
(i9o8) 142 Ill. App. 448; Lively v. Picton (19r4, C. C. A. 6th) 218 Fed. 4oi;
Stark Electric Ry. v. McGinty (1917, C. C. A. 6th) 238 Fed. 657; Greenbrier
Lumber Co. v. Ward (1887) 30 W. Va. 43, S. E. 227. It can be proceeded against
in bankruptcy. In re Munger Tire Co. (19o8, C. C. A. 2d) 159 Fed. 9oi.
Whether or not the body is like a de facto corporation in regard to personal
liability of the directors, the instant case is clearly sound in holding that any
rights against the latter are held subject to a liability of being divested and
replaced by rights solely against the corporation, at once on the latter's reinstate-
ment.
CRIMINAL LAW--TORTION-WHAT CONSTITUTES "INJuRY To PRopy."-The
defendant, an elevator inspector, obtained $50 from J. S. by threatening to report
falsely that his elevator was defective. An indictment thereupon charged the
defendant with obtaining money by extortion, "by the wrongful use of force and
fear, induced by the threat of the defendant to do an unlawful injury to his
property." It appeared that J. S. had no license to run an elevator. Held, that
the defendant was guilty of extortion and that preventing further use of the
elevator would be an "injury to property." People v. Sheridan (I919, N. Y.
App. Div.) 6o N. Y. L. J. 1783 (Mar. 3, 1919).
The term "property" may be used to describe physical objects or as an
inclusive tirm to describe those general or "multital" jural relations commonly
known as rights in rem. In the present case there was no threat to do injury to
physical objects. The threat to prevent use of the elevator would have been a
threat to destroy a valuable property privilege but for the fact that J. S. had no
permit and seems therefore not to have had such a privilege. Even without a
legal privilege, however, J. S. could physically operate the elevator, and this gave
him a valuable factual interest. It was by no means unreasonable in the instant
cse to extend the meaning of the word "property" to cover this factual interest,
especially as the term is used in an extortion statute. In a prosecution under the
same statute the court had said in a previous case: "The word, as here used, is
intended to embrace every species of valuable right and interest, and whatever
tends in any degree, no matter how small, to deprive one of that right, or interest,
deprives him of his property." People v. Warden (1911, N. Y.) 145 App. Div,
86i, 863, i3o N. Y. Supp. 698. Here "right" is evidently used to include all the
jural relations involved-the jural interest; and the term "interest" would
naturally include mere physical relations-a factual interest. In applying this
language, however, the instant decision goes beyond the earlier cases; for in the
latter the injury threatened was directed to existing jural relations- a true legal
interest; the complainant there had multital rights that there should be no inter-
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ference with his labor supply or his employment. People v. Warden, supra
(threat to cause complainant's discharge, a "right to labor" being described as
property); People v. Barondess (i891, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 6I Hun, 571 (threat to
prevent striking workmen from returning) ; People v. Weinseimer (1907, N. Y.)
117 App. Div. 603, iO2 N. Y. Supp. 579 (same).
EASEMENT AND LIcENSE-PARoL LICENSE IazvocABLE By ExxcuT'oN--EAsE-
MENT BY ."EsToPPEI. BY Dn."--The defendant owned the rear half of a lot
with a "right of way" over a strip of the front half of the lot. This strip was
immediately adjacent to the plaintiff's land and to the road thereon which he
used to reach the rear part of his lot. An oral agreement was made between the
plaintiff and the defendant to unite the roads, exchanging mutual licenses, the
defendant professing to have power to give the privilege of using his road to
the plaintiff. Pursuant to the agreement the plaintiff incurred considerable
expense in removing the dividing fences and otherwise improving the common
road. The defendant sometime later acquired title to the servient front half of
the lot and then undertook to keep the plaintiff off that part of the common
road situated thereon. The plaintiff brought suit to quiet title to his easement
and for an injunction. Held, that an injunction would issue. Chamberlin v.
Myers (1918, Ind. App.) 12o N. E. 6oo.
(I) The authorities are not in agreement with respect to the power to revoke
a license relating to real property, where the privilege conferred has been
exercised with considerable outlay of money. Washburn, Real Property (6th
ed., 19o2) secs. 843-846; io R. C. L. 792; Ann. Cas. I913A 74 note; see (1917)
26 YAiE LAW JOURNAL, 395. It is settled in Indiana, however, that on equitable
principles such a license is irrevocable where the licensee cannot be placed in
statu quo. Ferguson v. Spencer (189o) 127 Ind. 66, 25 N. E. 1035; Jann v.
Standard Cement Co. (1914) 54 Ind. App. 221, 1O2 N. E. 872; for analysis and
comparison of easement and license see (i917) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 66. (2)
But admitting in the normal case this immunity from revocation, it was con-
tended in the principal case that the giver of 'the license had merely a right of
way in the strip and therefore had no power to give such license; that therefore
the licensee could by virtue of his license have acquired no privilege of user to
Which the immunity claimed could attach. The doctrine of estoppel by deed is
an answer to such a contention, where the question involves a professed grant
of a fee in land later acquired by the grantor. 16 Cyc. 686. The same doctrine
applies where a limited estate, an easement, purports to be granted by deed.
Washburn, Easements and Servitudes (3d ed., 1873) 96; Goddard, The Law of
Easements (Bennett's ed., i88o) 95; Ewing v. DeSilver (1822, Pa.) 8 Serg.
L. R. 92; Jarnigan v. Mairs (184o, Tenn.) i Humph. 473; Swedish-American
Natl. Bank v. Connecticut Mutual, etc. Co. (19O1) 83 Minn. 377, 86 N. W. 420.
The principal case appears wholly sound in coupling the two doctrines, and
recognizing against the parol licensor whose license has thus become equivalent
to an easement by deed, an estoppel-as if by deed-to deny his original power
to confer either the license or the easement into which it has ripened.
EMINENT DomAIN-ABANDONMENT OF ROAD-COMPENSATION TO ABUTTING
OwNEs.-The plaintiff owned a farm abutting on a county highway, which
was the only means of access to his land. The county "abandoned" the road.
The plaintiff, claiming that he had lost a "special easement right" in the road,
apart from that lost by the public at large, and that his land had suffered
depreciation in value, sued the county for taking his private property without due
compensation. Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to damages. Morris v.
Covington County (i919, Miss.) 8o So. 337.
A city or county may have the power to abandon any road and extinguish all
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persons' privileges to pass along it. Davis v. County Comrs. (i891) 153 Mass.
218, 26 N. E. 848. The county is under no duty to non-abutting owners not to
exercise that power. Enders v. Friday (igo7) 78 Neb. 5io, iii N. W. x4o; but
see Falender v. Atkins (1917, Ind.) 114 N. E. 965. And "non-abutting owners"
seem to include those whose property touches only the end of the road. Kings-
highway Supply Co. v. Banner Iron Co. (i915) 266 Mo. 138, 181 S. E. 30. But
all courts recognize that an abutter has an interest in access to his land by the
highway, and, recognizing a de facto condition, have laid a duty on the county,
to the abutter, not to extinguish his interest by abandoning the road. Nor can
a statute do away with this duty. Coyne v. Memphis (i9o7) it8 Tenn. 65i, io2
S. W. 355. The stranded owner has no power to condemn an easement of way
into his land; the purpose would be private. But resort is had in his favor
to the law of eminent domain. Some courts hold the abutter's interest-his
"special easement," "appurtenant to his land"--to be "property" which is "taken"
by an abandonment. Cincinnati, etc. R. v. Cumminsville (1863) 14 Ohio St. 523;
see also Bigelow v. Ballerino (1896) 111 CaL 559, 44 Pac. 3o7. This is certainly
sound so far as it holds the legal relation, the privilege of passage, to be property.
Cf. (1918) 28 YALE LAw JOURNAr, 17r. And it may be that "taking for the public
use" fairly covers the destruction for private benefit of an individual's privilege
or other property, even without the acquisition by the public of any corresponding
interest. Some courts, however, unwilling to so construe "'taking," or unable
to think of property save as a physical thing, have refused compensation. See
Hunt v. Atlanta (897) ioo Ga. 274, 28 S. E. 65. This has been largely remedied
by statutes requiring compensation for damaging as well as for'taking property in
the public interest. I5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 49, note, at p. 56. Under such statutes,
and even under the first-mentioned line of decisions, compensation would seem
requisite where access was cut off from one direction only-the cul-de-sac
cases-or made more difficult: longer or steeper. But as the damage becomes less-
appreciable, the cases fall into the tone of police power cases generally; com-
pensation is given or not, at bottom, according as the court feels the individual
loss thrown on the plaintiff to be only a little, or outrageously much, greater
than that suffered by the public at large. Cf. (1918) 27 YAI.n LAw JoURNA 3"93.
The actual decisions conflict generously. Vanderburgh v. Minneapolis (i9o6)
98 Minn. 329, ro8 N. W. 48o, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 269 (recovery; "consequential"
damage to property) ; McCann v. Clark County (rpro) 149 Iowa, 13, 127 N. W.
ioi. Contra, Stanwood v. Malden (I892) 157 Mass. 17, 3 N. E. 7o2 (mere
diversion of traffic; no recovery); Burkley v. Omaha (igoS, Neb.) 167 N. W.
72. Another prolific source of conflict is the attempt-believed improper-which
is made by some courts to found the right of recovery on an implied term in the
contract of dedication of the highway; this has led to distinctions between city
streets and county roads, and between land fronting on the side and on the end
of a road which, it is submitted, run counter to common sense. Cf. Levee
District v. Farmer (1894) r1 Cal. 178, 35 Pac. 569; Bradbury v. Walton (1893)
94 Ky. 163, 21 S. W. 869; Kingshighway Supply Co. v. Banner Iron Co., supra.
EmINENT DOMAIN-TAKING FOR A PluvATE PuRPOsE-LIABmrY FOR INsTITU-
TING PRoC rIn .- The defendant water company instituted proceedings to con-
demn the plaintiff's land, professedly for a public but in fact for a private pur-
pose. The proceedings were abandoned before the determination of compensa-
tion and the plaintiff brought an action in tort for damages sustained in being
hindered and delayed in the timbering operations on his land. There was no
physical interference with the possession of the plaintiff. Held, that the plain-
tiff could recover the actual damages suffered. Sidelinker v. York Shore Water
Co. (I918, Me.) IoS AtL I22.
See COMMENTS, p. 588, supra.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
LIBEL AND SLANDER-PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS-STATEMENT AS TO CREDIT
PUBLISHED TO MEMBERS OF MERCHANTS' PROTECTIVE AssocrAnox.-LThe Perry
Merchants' Protective Association was declared in its constitution and by-laws
to be organized for the protection of its members against "those who live on the
confidence of humanity, and against loss by reason of extension of credit to those
unworthy of trust." The defendant caused to be published among the- other
members the name of the plaintiff as one who had failed to pay his account.
The plaintiff sued for libel, claiming that the publication by innuendo charged
him with belonging to the objectionable classes mentioned. Held, that the
innuendo was not supported by the communication, since the latter related merely
to the plaintiff's financial ability; and that the communication to other members
of facts regarding such ability was privileged. Putnal v. Inman (i918, Fla.) So
So. 316.
A publication as to the financial stability of possible customers made by an
association of traders-or others interested in extending credit-in order to
protect its members, may be privileged. Woodhouse v. Powles (igo6) 43 Wash.
617, 86 Pac. io63; Barr v. Musselbrugh Merchants' Assn. (1912, Ct. Sess.)
49 Sc. L. R. io2; McDonald v. Lee (1914) 246 Pa. 253, 92 Atl. 135. But
where the purpose is to coerce payment of old debts-which may be in dis-
pute-there is, very properly, no privilege. Masters v. Lee (1894) 39 Neb.
574, 58 N. W. 222. The association's agreement often helps to determine
into which class a given publication falls. See Weston- v. Barnicoat (igoo) 175
Mass. 454, 56 N. E. 619 (no sales to be made to a reported delinquent until pay-
ment; publication libelous); Reynolds v. Plumbers' Assn. (19o2) 169 N. Y.
614, 62 N. E. 1oo (delinquent to be made to pay cash before delivery; publica-
tion privileged). The principal case is clearly sound in finding privilege, where
the agreement was simply that if a member gave credit to a delinquent he would
assume the latter's debts to other members. In determining the extent of the
innuendo, and so the character of the publication, the courts are also guided by
the apparent purpose of such publication. See Muetze v. Tuteur (189o)
77 Wis. 236, 46 N. W. 123; State v. Armstrong (i8gi) 106 MO. 395, I6 S. W.
604 (bad debt collection agency; held to impute dishonesty as well as failure to
pay). Or by the manner of it. See Thompsonv.Adelberg &Berman (1918, Ky.)
205 S. W. 558 (placarding debtor's dwelling; libel) ; Muetze v. Tuteur, supra;
State v. Armstrong, supra (blatant envelopes: "Bad Debt Collection Agency";
libel). Or even by the presence or lack of mutuality of interest between publisher
and publishee. So McDonald v. Lee, supra, But falsity would seem to suffice
in itself to make the publication libelous. Werner v. Vogeli (19O1) 1O Kan. App.
536, 63 Pac. 6o7. There has been some tendency to protect traders very rigor-
ously, making any imputation of failure to pay their debts libel per se. See Fry
v. McCord (1895) 95 Tenn. 678, 33 S. W. 568. But this tendency seems to be
yielding to-day to the desirability of sounder credit extension; cf. in this con-
nection also the modern American doctrine on mercantile agency reports: 12
Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. i49, note.
LIB.L AND SLANDER-PRIILEGE OF COUNSEL IN PARDON HEABING-The plain-
tiff was instrumental in securing the conviction of the defendant's client on a
charge of abortion. -In a hearing before the Governor for a pardon, the defen-
dant attacked the character of the plaintiff. The plaintiff brought an action for
libel and the defendant claimed an absolute privilege as counsel. Held, that
the defendant's privilege was qualified as the proceeding was not strictly judicial.
Andrews v. Gardiner (1918, N. Y.) 121 N. E. 341.
The prevailing rule in the United States extends to, attorneys conducting
judicial proceedings an absolute immunity from liability in libel and slander for
words, otherwise defamatory, published in the course of such proceedings, pro-
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vided the statements are pertinent and relevant to the questions involved.
Youmans v. Smith (1897) 153 N. Y. 214, 47 N. E. 265; Maulsby v. Reifsnider
(1888) 69 Md. 143, 14 Atl. 5o5; Lawson v. Hicks (1862) 38 Al. 279, 81 Am.
Dec. 49. A few courts have afforded the same immunity when the statements
were made in proceedings for the disbarment of an attorney, in proceedings
before the Interstate Commerce Commission, and before the Governor in extradi-
tion proceedings. Brown v. Globe P. Co. (i9o8) 213 Mo. 61i, 112 S. W. 462;
Duncan v. Atchison, etc., R. Co. (I896) 72 Fed. 8o8, ig C. C. A. 202; Youmans v.
Smith, supra. And affidavits pertaining to the moral character of an applicant
for admission to the bar, when filed in obedience to a mandate of the court,
have been held absolutely privileged. Baggett v. Grady (19II) 154 N. C. 342,
70 S. E. 618. And the remarks of a college president before the board of trustees
which was investigating charges against his character were held absolutely
privileged on the ground that the board was properly functioning like a court of
law. Gattis v. Kilgo (igoi) 128 N. C. 402, 38 S. E. 931. However, the decision
of the instant case would seem to be in harmony with the tendency of the courts
not to extend the scope of absolute privilege in libel to include proceedings which
are not strictly judicial, although they are official and public. Binghanv. Gaynor
(1gxi) 203 N. Y. 27, 96 N. E. 84; Blakeslee v. Carroll (1894) 64 Conn. 223, 29
Atl. 473, 25 L. R. A. io6; Wright v. Lothrop (889) 149 Mass. 385. But on a
state of facts identical with that in the principal case, the Court of Civil Appeals
of Texas held the counsel's statement absolutely privileged. Connellee v. Blanton
(1914, Tex. Civ. App.) 163 S. W. 4o4.
pRizE LAW-RETALiATORY ORDER IN CouNcuL OF BELLIGERENT-NEUTRALS MUST
BEAR REASONABLE LOSsES.-A- Norwegian vessel bound from Norway to Rotter-
dam with iron-ore briquettes belonging to neutrals but destined to Germany was
stopped on the high seas and ordered to discharge her cargo in England. This
action was taken under an Order in Council, issued in retaliation against Ger-
many's war-zone decree, by which Order, without the establishment of a legal
blockade, all trade to and from neutral ports in cargo bound to or from Germany
was prohibited. The cargo having been sold and freight allowed, the neutral
owners of the vessel instituted a claim for damages arising out of her alltged
unlawful detention. Held, that the claim must. be dismissed. The Stigstad
(918, P. C.) 35 Times L. R. 176.
See COMMENTS, p. 583, supra.
RELEASE-PERSONAL INJURIES-RRASE OF MASTER AS BARRING ACTION AGAINST
StmGzoN.-The plaintiff suffered a rupture in his right groin while in the employ
of the New York Central R. R. He consulted the defendant, who,.mistaking thte
plaintiff for another of his patients, performed an operation on the. left Side.
The plaintiff executed a release of his claim against, the railroad, and later
brought this actioi against the defendant for the unauthorized surgical opera-
tion. Held, that the plaintiff could recover, as the operation on the left side was
a wholly wrongful, independent and intervening cause of action. Purchase v.
Seelye (1918, Mass.) 121 N. E. 413.
Where the plaintiff has exercised due care in engaging medical attendints,
the liability of the party who caused the original injury extends, not only to thit
injury, but also to negligence or lack of skill on the part of the attending
surgeon, such maltreatment being "constructively anticipated" as a "rational
result" of the original injury. Hunt v. Boston Terminal Co. (i912iy 212 Mass.
99, 98 N. E. 786; Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Bluhm (1884) log'ItL'2o, 50
Am. Rep. 6or. Hence a full release to the employer, without reservation, under
the law as to joint tort-feasors bars an action against the surgeon. Martin v.
Cunningham (I916) 93 Wash. 517, I6I Pac. 355. The principal case limits this
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doctrine, refusing to find causation by the railroad where the surgeon performed
a wholly unnecessary operation solely because of his failure to inform himself
of the patient's identity. Consequently, liability for the mistaken operation rests
on the surgeon alone. See Snow v. N. Y. N. H. & H. R. R. (1904) I85 Mass.
321, 70 N. E. 205; Scheffer v. Washington City V. M. & G. S. R. (1882) 1o5
U. S. 249, 26 L. ed. io7o. Clearly, the case is not one of joint or concurrent negli-
gence, where a release to one tort-feasor operates as a release to all, See
Mooney v. Chicago (199o) 238 Ill. 414, 88 N. E. 194; see also 
(1918) 28 YALE
LAw JOuRNAL, go, on the effect of reserving rights against one of the wrong-
doers; and see (915) 24 ibid. 5o5. To the release to the railroad, therefore, the
defendant stands a stranger; as where two adjoining owners overflow 
the
plaintiff's land with sewage, a release to one is utterly foreign to the other 
and
does not bar an action. Western Tube Co. v. Zang (899) 85 Ill. App. 63. 
Even
special payments by the railroad in consideration of the wrong caused by 
the
new, independent wrongdoer, have been held no defense for the latter, 
although
the amount paid may be set off. Scherger v. Lincoln Traction Co. (1912) 
91
Neb. 407, 136 N. W. 62; El Paso & S. R. R. v. Darr (i9o6, Tex.) 93 S. W. 
166;
Randall v. Gerrick (1i96) 93 Wash. 522, 155 Pac. 357.
TAXATION-STATE PowER To TAX STOCKHOLDERS IN NATIONAL BANK-LIMITED
WHEN BANK ALREADY TAXED AS A STOCKHOLDER IN ANOTHER 
NATIONAL BANK.-
A national bank A, in California, owned stock in another national bank B, 
and
in a state bank C, in that state. The Revised Statutes empower the states 
to tax
stockholders in national banks, but at a rate no greater than is assessed 
upon
other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens of the state. California
taxed bank A as a stockholder in bank B and in bank C, and also taxed 
the
stockholders of bank A on its entire assets, including in these taxable assets 
the
value of the stock, already taxed, owned by bank A in banks B and C. Held,
that the assessment of the stockholders of bank A on the amount already 
taxed
on the bank as a stockholder in bank B, and the assessment of bank 
A as a
stockholder in bank C were invalid. Pitney, Brandeis and Clarke, JJ., dissenting.
The Bank of California v. Richardson (i919) 39 Sup. Ct. 165.
The power of the states to tax national banks and their stockholders 
is
derived from and limited by federal statute. Rev. St. Sec. 5219; Covington V.
First Nati. Bank (19o4) 198 U. S. 10, 25 Sup. Ct. 562. The banks themselves as
federal agencies are exempted from state burden by taxation, except as to their
real estate; but the assets of stockholders in national banks are placed under
the state taxing power, subject to a limitation prohibiting discrimination 
as
against other moneyed capital. Amoskeag Savings Bank v. Purdy (1913) 231
U. S. 373; 393, 34 Sup. Ct. 114. The tax assessed on bank A as 
a stockholder in
bank C, the state bank, being a tax on a federal agency, was unauthorized by 
the
federal statute and was therefore void. Owensboro Nati. Bank v. Owensboro
(1899) 173 U. S. 664, 19 Sup. Ct. 537. A tax on the stock held by one national
bank in another national bank is valid under the grant of power to the states to
tax stockholders in national banks. National Bank of Redemption v. Boston,
(1887) 125 U. S. 6o, 8 Sup. Ct. 772. In disallowing the tax on 
the stockholders
of bank A in so far as the assets thus taxed included the value of the stock
already taxed on the bank as a stockholder in bank C, the court has adopted a
new and enlightened policy of piercing the corporate veil to establish the ultimate
beneficial interest of the stockholder. They therefore concluded that the double
tax was a discrimination against a stockholder in a national bank, against which
the federal statute was expressly designed to guard. The force of the common
view that the corporation and the stockholders are entirely different entities,
especially for purposes of taxation, is attested by Justice Pituey's vigorous
dissent, supported by ample authority. See particularly Owensboro Nati. Bank
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v. Owensboro, supra, and the cases there summarized, at pages 677-682. The
fallacies involved in this common theory are exposed by the late Professor
Hohfeld, Nature of Stockholder's Individual Liability for Corporation Debts in
(19o9) 9 COLUMBIA L. REv. 285, 288-291, note. The approval of the better view
by the Supreme Court is encouraging. The present federal income tax follows
this principle. But where there is no express limitation upon the taxing power,
the states have not generally been denied this power to tax both the corporation
and its stockholders.
TRADES UNIoNs-CLosED SHOP AGREEMENT-LABILiTY FOR PROCURING Dis-
CHARGE OR PREVENTING EMPLOYMENT.-The defendant union and the shoe manu-
facturers of Lynn, Massachusetts, had come to an agreement which provided that
none but union men should be employed. Because of the operation of this
agreement, the plaintiff was unable to hold or secure'employment. Held, that
the plaintiff had no cause of complaint if the motives of the defendant in making
the agreement were to secure all the work for the union and to enlarge and
strengthen the union organization. Shinsky v. OWeil et al. (I919, Mass.) 121
N. E. 790.
A workman has the right that others shall not combine to procure his dis-
charge or prevent his employment unless special circumstances "justify" the
interference. Erdman v. Mitchell (I9O3) 207 Pa. 79, 56 Atl. 327. That the
workman is a non-union man does not in itself privilege a union to procure his
discharge. Smith v. Bowen (i919, Mass.) 121 N. E. 814. But where the union
is seeking to secure the work for its own members, its action does not render it
liable to the man dismissed. National Protective Assn. v. Cummings (1902)
17o N. Y. 334, 63 N. E. 369. And so the instant case. But-see Lucke v. Clothing
Cutters, etc. (1893) 77 Md. 396, 26 Atl. 505. The existence of a closed shop
agreement may or may not privilege the union's action as an attempt to enforce
such agreement. It has been held, as in the principal case, that where the
agreement itself is not against public policy, it is justification per se. Jacobs v.
Cohen (igoS) 183 N. Y. 207, 76 N. E. 5; Hoban v. Dempsey (914) 217 Mass.
166, 1o4 N. E. 717, L. R. A. i9i5A 1217, Ann. Cas. 19i5C 8Io. But where the
agreement affected the whole of an industry in any one locality, it has been held
invalid and, therefore, no justification. Curran v. Galen (1897) 152 N. Y. 33, 46
N. E. 297; Connors v. Connolly (1913) 86 Conn. 641, 86 Atl. 6oo. There are
cases in Massachusetts, however, which look behind the agreement, and decide
that the union's conduct is actionable or not, according to the reason for which the
agreement is invoked. Berry v. Donovan (igo5) 188 Mass. 353, 74 N. E. 603, 5
L. R. A. (N. S.) 899, 3 Ann. Cas. 738 (invoked solely because plaintiff was non-
imion man) ; Shinsky v,. tracey (I9"I7) 226-Mass. 21, 114 N. E. 957 (invoked
to discipline plaintiff, a prior member of the union). Even the principal case
intimates that if the agreement were being enforced for the sole end of forcing
the defendant into the union, the action would not be privileged. But it is sub-
mitted that such a view in effect nullifies the closed shop contract, as between
the union and the non-union men, and thereby deprives the. union of one of its
most effective means of gaining an end conceded to be lawful, the strengthening
of its organization.
WORKMEN's COMPENsATIoN-DIsoBEDIENCE OF ORDERS-SCOPE OF THE EMPLOY-
MENT-SUNDAY EMPLOYMENT-ILLEGALITY OF CONTRACT.-The appellant had
entered cars in an automobile race held on Sunday. The decedent, a mechanic
regularly employed in the warehouse, was given charge of the pit on the track,
with instructions not to leave the pit. He left the pit to go to one of appellant's
cars which had stopped on the track, and was killed. Held, (I) that the injury
arose "in the course of" the employment; and (2) that the illegality of the
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contract does not affect the operation of the Act. Frint Motorcar Co. vz. Indus-
trial Commission (1919, Wis.) i7o N. W. 285.
(i) Whether an employee undertaking a given act is injured "in the course
of" his employment under the Act, depends first upon his contract of employ-
ment,---was he doing what he was hired to do? Spooner v. Detroit Saturday
Night Co. (1915) 187 Mich. 125, 153 N. W. 651; Re McNicols (1913) 215 Mass.
497, io2 N. E. 697. Or was he doing something reasonably incidental thereto?
Terlecki v. Strauss (i914, Sup. Ct.) 85 N. J. L. 454, 89 Atl. io23; State v. Dis-
trict Court (1915) 129 Minn. 176, 15I N. W. 912. Or doing additional acts at
the direction or with the consent of his employer? Griebe v. Hammerle (igi8)
222 N. Y. 382, 118 N. E. 8o5; Miner v. Franklin Telegraph Co. (igio) 83 Vt.
311, 75 Atl. 653. This last rule would clearly serve in the principal case to cover
the extra work done in the pit, although not the voluntary service contrary to
instructions, out of which the fatal injury arose. But zealous employees have
been compensated as if " in the course of" their employment when doing
something totally different from their regular duties, providing they were honest
in attempting to serve their employer's interest. Rees v. Thomas (C. A.) [1899]
i Q. B. ioi5 (miner undertook to stop runaway tramway truck horse in pit);
Hartz v. Hartford "Faience Co. (1916) go Conn. 539, 97 Atl. 1O2O (shipping
clerk undertook to lift barrel). The service here undertaken answers the only
test applied to such work: it wds one which he might be expected to undertake.
UWilliamson v. Industrial Acc. Com. (19i8, Cal.) I71 Pac. 797 (chambermaid not
expected to take over absent janitor's work of cleaning a light well).
(2) In the matter of illegality the Wisconsin Court seems to draw a distinc-
tion between the contract of employment and the relation of employer and
employee, the liability under the Act being said to arise wholly out of the latter.
Anderson v. Miller Scrap Iron Co. (igig, Wis.) i7o N. W. 275, 277; but see
contra, Kennerson v. Thames Towboat Co. (I915) 89 Conn. 367, 94 AUt. 372; and
see discussion (1917) 27 YALE LAW JoURNArL, 113. For instance, in regard to
illegal employment of minors, Wisconsin seems to hold that the relation in ques-
tion arises on work being actually done, even under a prohibited contract, if the
parties have by law capacity to contract for any employment at all. Foth v.
Macomber & Whyte Rope Co. (1915) 161 Wis. 549, 154 N. W. 369 (minor per-
mitted by law to work at some things, but injured while doing others; recovery);
Stetz v. Mayer Boot & Shoe Co. (1916) 163 Wis. 15I, 156 N. W. 971 (minor
absolutely forbidden to work; no recovery); see also in this connection the
cases discussed (igig) 28 YALE LAW JOURNATL, 5o9. The Wisconsin distinction is
by no means universal. See Lostutter v. Brown Shoe Co. (i96) 203 IlL. App.
517. But under it the relation of master and servant would exist between.
persons sui juris, whether or not the contract was a Sunday one. Yet, the
plaintiff being regularly employed by the defendant, it would seem sufficient to
explain the instant case, without reference to illegality of contract, that this
particular Sunday work was merely extra work undertaken at the employer's
direction. See Hugh v. Atlanta Steel Co. (1911) 136 Ga. 511, 71 S. E. 728;
Ann. Cas. 1912C 394, note.
